The recent NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal decision in Nicholson v The Owners – Strata Plan No 104042 [2025] NSWCATCD 202 provides important guidance on the limits of an owners corporation’s power to pass by-laws regulating short-term rental accommodation in the scheme. More importantly however the decision reinforces a broader principle which is, that by-laws in general cannot be drafted to create a potentially open-ended and private debt recovery régime against owners that purports to operate outside the supervision of the Tribunal or the courts.
Key Takeaways
The decision confirms that when making by-laws, an Owners Corporation should be cautious to avoid provisions that purport to recover costs from lot owners “as a debt” particularly where the amount payable is left to the unilateral determination of the owners corporation.
Any entitlement to recover costs should be carefully drafted and subject always to the ordinary supervisory jurisdiction of the Tribunal or the courts. Specifically, in relation to bonds these may still be valid provided the bond serves a legitimate purpose and does not impose a financial barrier to the exercise of a property right that exceeds what is necessary to protect the interests of the scheme.
The upshot is that an owners corporation is entitled to make by-laws to regulate conduct within a scheme, provided these do not create enforcement mechanisms that purport to bypass judicial oversight.
The Background
Angela Nicholson owned an apartment in the mixed-use “Sky Residence” development in Newcastle and had historically used her lot for short-term rental accommodation. The owners corporation later adopted a special by-law under section 136 of the SSMA regulating short-term letting. The by-law required:
- payment of an administration fee;
- payment of a $1,000 bond (or another amount determined by the strata committee) before short-term letting could occur; and
- permitted the owners corporation to recover administration fees “as a debt” from the lot owner.
Ms Nicholson failed to comply with the above and the owners corporation attempted to enforce the by-law terms against her by the issuing of notices to comply for breach of the by-law and making demands for payment.
Ms Nicholson commenced proceedings in the Tribunal seeking declarations that the by-law was “harsh, unconscionable or oppressive” in contravention of section 139 of the SSMA and should therefore be declared invalid under section 150. Ms Nicholson also sought the compulsory appointment of a strata managing agent under section 237 of the SSMA.
Was the By-Law Inconsistent with Section 137A?
An argument advanced by Ms Nicholson was that the by-law conflicted with section 137A of the SSMA and the NSW Code of Conduct for the Short-Term Rental Accommodation Industry. Relevantly, section 137A of the SSMA upholds the right of owners corporations to pass a by-law banning short-term letting in the scheme provided that the lot is not the owner’s principal place of residence whilst at the same time expressly preserving an owner’s ability to short-term let their principal place of residence.
The Tribunal rejected this argument, instead deciding that the Parliament did not intend to prevent owners corporations from passing by-laws to manage the impacts of short-term rental accommodation in the scheme. Rather the legislative intention was limited to protecting an owner’s right to share their own home. Placing reasonable conditions on short- term letting was therefore not to found to conflict with section 137A of the SSMA, at least not in and of itself.
The Administration Fee
The administration fee provisions were ultimately proven as the owners corporation’s undoing. The by-law defined “Administration Fee” broadly to include any reasonable administrative costs together with any other costs and expenses incurred by the owners corporation arising directly from a lot being used for short-term rental accommodation. The by-law also permitted those amounts to be recovered “as a debt” from the lot owner.
At first glance, the drafting appeared carefully considered. Rather than imposing an arbitrary penalty on lot owners, recovery was limited to indemnifying the owners corporation for only those costs incurred by the owners corporation arising as a direct result of the owner using their lot for short term rental accommodation. A reasonableness requirement was also built into the clause as well.
The Tribunal nevertheless found the provisions to be invalid in so far as it effectively allowed the owners corporation to determine for itself what costs were payable, including potentially legally costs associated with recovery and then to seek to recover these amounts as a debt from the lot owner. In doing so, the by-law shifted the financial risk of the owners corporation’s administrative decisions entirely onto the lot owner without independent oversight. The Tribunal concluded that this created an unreasonable and open-ended financial liability which was “harsh, unconscionable and oppressive” in contravention of section 139 of the SSMA.
The Bond Requirement
The Tribunal also considered the requirement that owners pay a $1,000 bond, or another amount determined by the strata committee, before being permitted to use their lot for short-term rental accommodation. The owners corporation argued that the bond was justified given previous damage caused to common property by short-term occupants. The Tribunal accepted that protecting common property was a legitimate objective. However, it observed that the SSMA already provides mechanisms to recover the cost of damage to common property and to enforce by-laws.
Importantly, unlike a residential tenancy bond held by a statutory authority, the proposed bond would be held by the owners corporation, with the strata committee retaining discretion to determine if a higher amount was payable as the bond. The Tribunal found that this created uncertainty and the potential for inconsistent or discriminatory application. Accordingly, the bond requirement was held to be oppressive because it imposed a financial barrier on the exercise of a lot owner’s property right that exceeded what was reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the scheme.
Could the Invalid Clauses Be Severed?
Having found the administration fee and the bond provisions invalid, the Tribunal considered whether it was possible to sever the offending clauses whilst leaving the remainder of the by-law intact. Ultimately this was found not to be possible. The financial protections formed an integral part of the owners corporation’s decision to regulate short-term rental accommodation in the scheme. It could not be assumed that the owners corporation would have passed the by-law without the accompanying financial securities and indemnities it deemed necessary to protect its interests. As a result, the entire by-law was declared invalid pursuant to section 150 of the SSMA.
Compulsory Appointment of a Strata Manager
Ms Nicholson also sought the compulsory appointment of a strata managing agent under section 237. Although the Tribunal accepted that the owners corporation had departed from its own enforcement policy by failing to issue a courtesy letter before serving a notice to comply, this was not sufficient to demonstrate the level of dysfunction required for compulsory management. The Tribunal noted that the owners corporation continued to function effectively by holding meetings, raising levies, maintaining insurance and making operational decisions. The dispute concerned a private dispute between Ms Nicholson and the owners corporation regarding the interpretation and enforcement of a specific by-law rather than systemic management failures. The application for compulsory appointment was therefore dismissed.
An Important Reminder About Legal Professional Privilege
The decision also contains a useful reminder about the importance of maintaining legal professional privilege in litigation. In her evidence, Ms Nicholson stated that she had received legal advice which “supports” her understanding of the law and “confirms” that the by-law was invalid. The owners corporation successfully argued that privilege had been waived and sought production of the legal advice. The Tribunal agreed with the owners corporation and held that by voluntarily relying upon the substance and conclusions of the advice to strengthen her case, Ms Nicholson had acted inconsistently with maintaining privilege. It would have been unfair to permit her to rely upon the favourable conclusion of the advice while preventing the owners corporation from examining the reasoning behind it. The advice was therefore admitted into evidence.